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Abstract
How can a manager inuence workers' activity while knowing little
about it? This paper examines a situation where production requires
several tasks, and the manager wants to direct production to achieve
a preferred allocation of eort across tasks. However, the eort that
is required for each task cannot be observed, and the production re-
sult is the only indicator of worker activity. This paper illustrates
that in this situation, the manager cannot implement the preferred
allocation with a single worker. On the other hand, the manager is
able to implement the preferred allocation by inducing a game among
several workers. Gains to workers from collusion may be eliminated
by an ability-dependent, but potentially inecient, task assignment.
These ndings provide a new explanation for the division of labor, and
bureaucratic features such as "over"-specialization and "wrong" task
allocation.
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1 Introduction
Division of labor has been a central theme in economic analysis since Adam
Smith (1776) and a cornerstone of Frederick Winslow Taylor's \scientic
management" (1911). Traditionally, the advantages of the division of la-
bor have been attributed to the productive gains from learning by doing,
economies of scale and comparative advantages. This paper argues that the
division of labor has another advantage that has so far been neglected: it
helps to inuence the production method, when only the production result
is veriable.
In many production processes, little is known about how a particular
result has been achieved. For example, software may run well due to careful
engineering or due to extensive debugging; exam results can be improved
by better teaching or by rehearsing test situations; a placement ocer may
be successful because she brushes up job seekers' interview skills or because
she nds adequate vacancies. Although it is hard, or even impossible, to
deduce how such outcomes are produced, it is often important to inuence
the decision of how to produce because some production methods are more
desirable than others. Maintaining software is easier when it is well-designed;
coping with test situations is only a secondary goal of the education system;
job agencies prefer adequate and hence longer lasting placements.
This paper considers a multiple task principal-agent problem in which
each task requires eort, the organizer of production (principal) prefers a
specic allocation of eort, agents who work for her prefer a dierent allo-
cation, and the only evidence of production is the nal result. The principal
cannot enforce eort, but she can prevent agents from exerting eort as she
controls necessary assets. For example, she can withhold tools and material,
or prohibit entry to certain production areas. However, the power of the
principal is rather limited, as all tasks are required, and she has to allow at
least one agent to use the task's respective asset. Can the principal ensure
that production occurs in the desirable way despite such drastic limitations?
The paper shows that a single agent cannot be induced to produce in the
1desired way. The principal can pay the agent for a specic production result,
and will even obtain this result, but the agent will focus eort according to
his preferences.
The central result of this paper is that division of labor allows the prin-
cipal to implement her desired production method, even though individual
or task-wise eort cannot be veried. The intuition is simple. Each agent
carries out only one task, and the principal pays on the basis of the overall
result. Thus, an agent can only aect this result|and hence his pay|by
changing his eort on his task. By adjusting the pay to a specic agent, the
principal aects the eort of this agent and hence the eort exerted at this
task. As this can be done separately for every agent, the desired allocation
can be obtained. This result provides a novel explanation for the division
of labor. Note that it is essential that the principal limits the agents' dis-
cretion over who carries out which task. Otherwise, agents will produce the
result while performing their preferred tasks, which may not correspond to
the desired production method.
A second nding is that the principal can implement her desired produc-
tion method in a collusion-proof manner. Colluding agents have the same
freedom to obtain a result as a single agent. Similar to a single agent, col-
luding agents can focus their eort on easy tasks, and reimburse the agents
who are working on these tasks. The principal, however, can make such de-
viations unattractive by assigning easy tasks to unproductive agents. This
nding explains inecient task assignments.
This paper is closely related to the work of Dewatripont and Tirole (1999),
but diers at a crucial point. In the setting of Dewatripont and Tirole, an
agent can obtain the same result (for example, a verdict) by slacking on two
conicting tasks (for example, gathering less incriminating and exonerating
evidence). In many production contexts, the same result can only be ob-
tained if the reduction of eort on one task is compensated by an increase
of eort on another task (for example, less careful programming is oset by
more debugging). This paper's analysis covers such non-conicting tasks.
Specialization facilitates implementation, regardless of the nature of tasks.
The implications of specialization are, however, very dierent. Where tasks
are conicting, incentive provision leads to competition. Competing agents
impose a negative externality on each other. Where tasks are non-conicting,
agents have a joint interest in producing the result, and the externality is pos-
itive. Secondly, competition among agents invites sabotage activities, which
are absent when tasks are non-conicting. Finally, collusion is unavoidable
2with conicting tasks, as agents gain by ceasing competition and slacking.
In the situation analyzed here, collusion can sometimes be prevented by an
appropriate assignment of agents to tasks.
The paper's ndings also extend and complement the literature on multi-
task principal-agent models that were pioneered by Holmstr om and Milgrom
(1991). Recent contributions to this literature analyze which information
about the activity of a single agent needs to be veriable in order to obtain
a desired allocation of eort across tasks (Baker 2002, Schnedler 2006 and
forthcoming). While these models tackle the problem that eort allocation
cannot be identied from the production result,1 they do not consider the
benecial eect of labor division.
Implementing the desired production method requires that several agents
be remunerated on the basis of a joint production result.2 While the exis-
tence of teams has been attributed to interaction in the production function
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) or due to task-wise additive separable and
convex eort costs (Itoh, 1991), this paper contributes the alternative expla-
nation that teamwork, rather than individual work, ensures a particular way
of production. All team members are indeed engaged in productive work,
and this distinguishes this paper's model from others in which incentives
are improved because agents supervise their colleagues (see Strausz 1997 or
Athey and Roberts 2001). The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section two sets up the model, and section three shows how the desired
production method can only be implemented if labor is divided. Section four
examines when and how the desired production can still be implemented by a
specic task assignment when agents collude. Finally, section ve concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a principal who wants to produce a good that involves two tasks.
One task is easy (task E) and the other task is demanding (task D). Lacking
the time or skills to do the tasks herself, the principal employs one or two
1Similarly, talent and eort cannot be identied in career concern models (Fama 1980,
Holmstr om 1999, Gibbons and Murphy 1992) and Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999)
show that rotating tasks can solve this identication problem.
2Of course, joint production has also costs. Notably, workers may free-ride on their
colleagues' eort. In our analysis these costs do not feature because the principal acts as
a budget breaker (Holmstr om, 1982).
3agents to do the job. Each task involves an eort choice by agent i who
carries out the task: eD
i and eE
i , where both are non-negative real numbers
from a bounded interval. Agents are allowed to mix over pure eort choices,
and the corresponding cumulative distribution function for agent i is denoted
by Fi while Pi(ei = e) is the probability that i chooses e if e is a mass point.
In line with the examples from the introduction, the principal cares about
how production is achieved. Denote the eort choices desired by the principal
by eD for the dicult task and eE for the easy task. In the following,
we examine the conditions under which these desired eort choices can be
implemented.
The model assumes that eort is costly for the agent. In order to elimi-
nate economies of scale and other incentives to specialize, the model assumes
that costs are additively separable. The cost of agent i in task k, ck
i , is
a continuously dierentiable function of eort that increases and is strictly
convex. 3 The eort levels that an agent is willing to exert without incen-
tives are denoted by eD0 and eE0, and the respective costs are normalized to
zero: cD
i (eD0) = cE
i (eE0) = 0: In order to make the implementation problem
interesting, the model assumes that eD0 6= eD and eD0 6= eD
We attach meaning to the labels \dicult" and \easy" of the two tasks
by assuming that the marginal costs of both tasks are not identical given the
















If the production method (the eort choices) could be veried by a court
of law, the principal could hire a single agent and stipulate the desired eort
levels in a contract. This contract would then work as a device to direct the
agent's eort. In many settings, however, the only evidence is the result of
production R, and it is not always clear how this result has been achieved.
Accordingly, the model assumes that contracts about task-wise eorts cannot
be written, and that anything that reveals how the result has been generated
(for example, intermediate stages of production) cannot be veried.4 In
3More generally, the agent may not exert eort but have a choice which aects himself
as well as the principal. However, ordering these choices according to costs and speaking
of eort greatly simplies the illustration.
4It may well be possible that they can be veried later when the agent can no longer
be held responsible|perhaps because he is working for another employer or retired.
4short, the benet of the principal is private information, and the action of
the agent is hidden. The contractual environment is thus that of a "coping
organization" according to Wilson (1989). Summarizing these considerations,
the model assumes that the only veriable quantity R is a function of both
eorts. Notice that R is not stochastic. Still, R is imperfect as it confounds
eort on both tasks and does not reveal exactly what the agent did.5
The principal may care about the production result R; for example, if
she sells the product on a market. More importantly, she also cares about
how the result is achieved. For example, neglecting the demanding task
may lead to a higher probability of product breakdown, and damage the
rm's reputation, or it may lead to more wear- and-tear of the production
equipment, and necessitate costly repairs.6
In their seminal paper on advocates, Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) also
suppose that the only veriable variable, whether a culprit is convicted or
not, is the result of two eort choices: searching for incriminating evidence,
and searching for exculpatory evidence. These two eorts are conicting. A
larger R, say, conviction, can be obtained by increasing eort on one task, for
example, searching harder for incriminating evidence, but also by decreasing
eort on another task, for example, looking less hard for exculpatory evi-
dence. In many production settings, it is not possible to improve a result by
reducing eort. To the contrary, eort needs to be increased at least in one
task to obtain a larger outcome. In these settings, tasks are non-conicting,
because the agent does not nullify the eect of eort in one task by increas-
ing eort in another task. The paper examines such production settings, and
assumes that the result R is an increasing (concave and twice continuously
dierentiable) function of eort exerted in the two tasks.
The result from the desired eort choice is denoted by r := R(eD;eE).
An immediate consequence of the fact that the outcome increases and is
continuous in both eorts is that the outcome r can also be achieved by
some other eort choice. The crucial assumption of our model is that given
the desired allocation (eD;eE), increasing eort on the easy task is at least
as eective in generating a larger outcome than increasing eort on the de-
5The crucial mechanism that drives our results works also if the output measurement
is noisy. However, eliminating noise simplies the analysis.
6See the introduction for additional examples in which not only output but also the













   
eD=eD;eE=eE
: (2)
This assumption reects the idea that often, there is an easier way than
the desired one to produce an output. This paper will show that the presence
of this opportunity may render the implementation of the desired production
method impossible.
So far, the model has assumed that the production outcome is the only
veriable result of the agent's eort choice. By conditioning transfers  on
this outcome, the principal can inuence the agent's choice. The model's nal
assumption is that the principal has another more basic, but very limited,
method to control what the agent is doing. She can assign tasks to one or
more agents. More specically, she can prevent agents from carrying out a
task. In practice, this could be done by withholding material or instruments
needed for the task, restricting access to a location at which the task is
performed, or refraining from training the worker to carry out the task. The
most common form of prevention is prohibiting the agent from carrying out
a task. In many circumstances, it is very simple to describe what the agent
should not do, and much harder to describe what the agent should do. For
example, there is, to our knowledge, no veriable denition of good teaching
practice, while it is relatively simple to spot whether a class is rehearsing a
test. Whenever the principal controls an asset required for a task, she can
prevent the agent from carrying out this task. If, however, the principal
provides the necessary asset, this by no means implies that the agent will use
the asset in the desired way.
3 Directing production
This section examines the organizational form within which the principal can
implement the desired production method. The section rst looks into the
single-agent case, and then moves to the two-agent case.
3.1 Single-agent case
In the case where the principal only employs one agent, implementation is
only possible if the agent is allowed to carry out all tasks. The implementa-
6tion problem then consists in nding transfers  at which the agent is willing
to exert the desired eort allocation.
In order to implement the desired eort allocation, the agent has to be
rewarded whenever the production result looks like it has been achieved by
such allocation. In this case, however, he will produce this result in the
cheapest, and not necessarily the most desired, way. Formally, the following
result holds:
Proposition 1 (Window-dressing by a single agent). If there is a single agent
i and the principal provides incentives to implement r, then the agent can
protably engage in window dressing, i.e. reduce eort on the demanding task
and increase eort on the easy task. The desired production method cannot
be implemented.
Proof. To implement the desired production method, it is a necessary con-
dition that the agent creates the result r. Whatever the incentive scheme
used to implement (eD;eE) and hence r, the agent can obtain the same
result and transfer by increasing eort on the easy task and reducing eort
on the demanding task. The marginal reduction can be computed using the





@eD R(eD;eE): This derivative is larger
than one for (eD;eE) by Equation (2), thus increasing eE by one unit al-
lows the agent to reduce eD by at least one unit. The loss from increasing
eort in the easy task is outweighed by the gain from reducing eort in the
dicult task by Equation (1). So, deviating from (eD;eE) is protable for
the agent.
The main message of this proposition is that any attempt by the princi-
pal to achieve the desired production method is doomed, because the agent
always prefers a dierent eort allocation (refer to Figure 1). More specif-
ically, the agent always slacks on the demanding task, and brushes up the
appearance using the easy task. The crucial feature of the veriable outcome
R, which drives this result, is that it confounds the eorts of two (non-
conicting) tasks. This feature, together with the (local) preference for the
easy task, suces for the agent to engage in window-dressing rather than
carrying out production in the desired way. This problem is not specic to
deterministic environments. As long as the task on which the agent focuses
eort matters, and as long as this eort cannot be identied by looking at
the production result, window-dressing is possible.
7The principal can circumvent this problem by assigning the easy task to
another agent. This will be explored in the following sub-section.
Figure 1: Deviating from the desired production method by slacking on the
demanding task ( eD) and working harder on the easy task (eE) leads to
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In this section, we analyze the situation in which the principal hires two
agents, and assigns them to the two tasks. This type of specialization enables
the principal to implement the desired production method.
Proposition 2 (Implementation of the desired production method). If agents
are assigned to dierent tasks (specialization), transfers can be chosen such
that the desired production method (eD;eE) can be implemented as a (unique)
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. In order to show that (eD;eE) can be implemented as a (unique)
Nash equilibrium, we consider two agents i = 1;2, specify transfers, elimi-
nate some strictly dominated strategies and compute the best-reply corre-
spondences. For notational convenience, we focus on agent 1 and let him
work on the demanding task (the analysis for agent 2 is completely analo-






1 (eD) if R(e1;e2) = r
 K if R(e1;e2) = R(eD0;eE0) =: r0
0 else,
where K > 0. For the transfers to agent 2 replace eD by eE.
Before determining best-reply correspondences given these transfers, we
show that eorts that lead to negative payos are strictly dominated. Ob-
serve that agent 1 can always obtain a payo of at least  ; where  is an
arbitrary small positive number, irrespective of the action chosen by agent 2.
The respective strategy is to exert slightly more eort than eD0, say eD0 +.
The same holds for agent 2. Since eort above the desired level eD always
leads to a negative payo, these eorts are strictly dominated. In equilibrium
the support of the strategy of agent 2 is hence a subset of E2 := fe2  eEg.
Given this observation about E2, the payo to agent 1 from a (possibly








(1(R(e1;e2))   c1(e1))dF1(e1)dF2(e2) (3)
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)   c1(e1))dF1(e1): (5)
Note that this payo can at most be zero: the integrand of the integral in
line (3) is zero only if e1 = eD0 and otherwise negative; the integrand of the
integral in line (4) is zero only if e = eD or e = eD0 and otherwise negative;
the integrand in line (5) is always negative.
We use this payo to compute the best-replies. We decompose the strat-
egy space of agent 2 into three cases.
Case 1: P2(e2 = eE0) > 0. Agent 1's payo is negative due to line (5) and
he can protably deviate to eD0 +  with  chosen to be suciently small.
Therefore, there is no best-reply for agent 1 in this case.
Case 2: P2(e2 = eE0) = 0 and P2(e2 = eE) < 1. Line (3) implies that
any strategy with P1(e1 = eD0) < 1 yields negative payo and is strictly
dominated by eD0. Thus, the best-reply in this case is eD0.
9Case 3: P2(e2 = eE0) = 0 and P2(e2 = eE) = 1. Only line (4) matters, and
any strategy with P1(e1 = eD0) + P1(e1 = eD) < 1 yields a negative payo.
Thus, the support of the best-reply is eD0 and eD in this case.
A completely analogous argument for agent 2 shows that (eD;eE) is the
only xed-point of the best-reply correspondences.
The proof of this proposition is constructive and provides specic transfers
that implement the desired production method. These transfers have to
fulll two conditions: (i) they need to work for the general class of result
functions considered, and (ii) they need to implement the desired method
as a unique Nash equilibrium. Both conditions are met by discontinuous
transfers that reward the desired outcome r, and punish the outcome from
low eorts r0. The discontinuity implies that there is no best-reply if the
other agent exerts the minimal eort, and transfers are reminiscent of a
scheme used by Holmstr om (1982) in order to approximate the rst-best
solution in a single-task setting with noise (Theorem 3 in Holmstr om, 1982).
Diering from Holmstr om's scheme, where the approximation requires ever
larger punishments that occur with ever lower probabilities, the punishment
here can be arbitrarily small. Moreover, the discontinuity is not essential
for implementation as such (as in Holmstr om's argument), but only ensures
uniqueness (see appendix). For specic result functions, it is possible to
implement the desired allocation as a unique equilibrium even if transfers
are continuous (for example, if the marginal eect of an agent on the result
increases in the eort of the other agent|see appendix). The key ingredient
in any mechanism to implement the desired allocation is that the principal
gains an extra degree of freedom by having two agents: task separation allows
her to set incentives separately for the two tasks.
The implementation of the desired production requires that the agent
who is responsible for the demanding task has no access to the easy task.
Otherwise, this agent could again protably engage in window dressing.
The fact that the agent who carries out the demanding task has to be
prevented from carrying out the easy task can entail direct costs, such as not
being able to access certain areas or use certain tools. These costs may render
it more dicult for him to carry out his tasks. Similarly, there may be a price
for installing the necessary technology to ensure that the agent assigned to
the demanding task is not working on the easy task. Moreover, hiring the
additional agent can be costly, and nding an equally productive agent may
not be possible. Proposition 2 provides a reason why specialization occurs
10despite all these costs, and in the absence of the advantages that are typically
associated with specialization. Thus, it explains why a principal hires a less
productive or otherwise costly agent, although the same observable result
could be produced less expensively by a single agent.
The desired production method is achieved while the production technol-
ogy remains the same. Moreover, the only contractual variable, the result
of production,R, is also exactly the same. The crucial dierence is that the
principal employs two agents instead of one. Accordingly, the desired pro-
duction may no longer be possible if the two agents act as if they were one
agent. In other words, the two agents might collude, and thereby undermine
the incentive scheme. This problem is explored in the following section.
4 Collusion
Collusion is only possible when agents have a larger contract space than the
principal, so as to formally or informally contract on the easy task. For exam-
ple, agents may engage in repeated interactions while the principal is being
replaced.7 We dene the implementation of an eort choice e as collusion-
proof when there is no contract among agents that stipulates transfers and
eort choices dierent from e such that at least one agent is better o and
none of them is worse o.8
If two agents collude, they will minimize their joint costs. If their marginal
costs are identical, they are in the same position as a single agent. In this case,
division of labor cannot help to implement the desired production method.
However, the fact that all agents nd one task demanding and the other
one easy does not mean that all agents have to have identical marginal costs.
There may, for example, be strong agents whose marginal costs for both tasks
are lower than those of weak agents. This dierence in marginal costs enables
the implementation of the desired production method even when agents can
collude. If a strong agent is assigned to the demanding task and a weak
agent to the easy task, the gains from slacking on the demanding task may
be more than oset by the loss from greater eort on the easy task. Figure 2
provides an example.
7Roy (1952) reports on workers' behavior in a production line where workers were able
to enforce eort levels in order to restrict joint output, while the employer was unable to
observe it.
8This denition of collusion-proofness is in line with Tirole (1986).
11Figure 2: The gains to an agent with low marginal costs (2) from slacking
are oset by the costs to the agent with high marginal costs (3) from higher
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12Proposition 3 (Collusion-proof implementation). A collusion-proof imple-
mentation of the desired production method is possible if and only if there
is a (specialized) assignment of agents to tasks such that the desired way of















where i refers to the agent on the dicult task and j to that on the easy task
i 6= j.
Proof. As a preliminary step, let us examine the problem of minimizing the



















j is a continuous function, eorts are bounded and the side-
constraint denes a closed set, the minimizer always exists. Let us denote
the minimizer by e:
The rst step of the proof is to illustrate that it is impossible to im-
plement e := (eD;eE) in a collusion-proof manner when this choice does
not minimize the costs of producing r: (eD;eE) 62 argmineD;eEfcD
i (eD) +
cE
j (eE)jR(eD;eE) = rg: Suppose a respective mechanism exists, then the
agents can write a contract that stipulates e and leads to the same observ-
able result r. The agent with a higher eort under this contract can be
compensated for the additional eort by the other agent, and the latter is
still strictly better o because the joint costs of production are lower for e
than for e. Accordingly, the implementation is not collusion-proof.
The second step of the proof is to show that it is possible to implement e
in a collusion-proof manner when it minimizes production costs (eD;eE) 2
argmineD;eEfcD
i (eD)+cE
j (eE)jR(eD;eE) = rg: For this step of the proof, take
the transfers from Proposition 2. The payo from (eE;eD) is non-negative,
whereas any result dierent from r does not yield a payo that is larger than
zero. So, agents cannot gain from a contract that stipulates eorts that lead
to a result dierent from r. Within the eort allocations that lead to r, the
desired production method has the lowest costs. Thus, there is no contract
that leads to a weakly better payo for both agents and to a strictly better
payo for at least one agent. The implementation is collusion-proof.
Again, the ability of the principal to prevent agents from carrying out
certain tasks is crucial here. If the strong agent has access to the easy task,
13agents would maximize their joint surplus by letting the strong agent do
all the work. Then, window dressing by this agent would be a protable
deviation from the desired way of production.
It would be wrong to conclude from this proposition that the negative
consequences of collusion can generally be avoided. This requires a specic
relationship between the costs of agents and it may be dicult to nd such
agents. The key idea that is formalized by this proposition is that deviations
from the desired allocation can be made more costly by assigning an agent
with high marginal costs to the easy task, and an agent with low marginal
costs to the demanding task. This idea allows the principal to obtain an
allocation that is closer to the desired one, even if the desired allocation
itself cannot be achieved.
Notice that the assignment of agents to tasks is entirely driven by the
desire to implement a certain allocation. This assignment is based on the
strong agent's marginal costs in the demanding task and the weak agent's
marginal costs in the easy task. In particular, the assignment is independent
of the relative marginal costs of agents with respect to tasks. Thus, agents
may not be assigned to tasks where they have a comparative advantage. In
other words, an inecient task assignment may be the only way to ensure
that the desired allocation (or an allocation close to it) can be implemented
in a collusion-proof manner. This could explain why large organizations and
bureaucracies that are designed to achieve a specic goal are often plagued
by inecient allocation of workers to tasks.
5 Conclusion
Consider a scenario in which the only evidence of an agent's performance
is the nal result of production, and there is no way of verifying how such
result has been achieved. This paper has shown that in this scenario, it is
not possible to direct a single agent's eort toward tasks in a desired way.
However, this problem can be overcome by splitting the production process
such that agents are assigned specic tasks, and are prevented from carrying
out the tasks that other agents are assigned to.
Division of labor entails costs that should be traded o against its bene-
ts. These costs include the costs of hiring workers, the costs of communica-
tion and coordination among workers (refer to Becker and Murphy 1992 or
Bolton and Dewatripont 1994), the forgone benets from task complemen-
14tarities (Lindbeck and Snower, 2000), and the possibly higher compensation
required by workers that like variation (i.e. workers with convex costs that
are additively separable across tasks, see Itoh 1992). The costs of labor
division increase further if such division has to be enforced.
The rst main insight of this paper is that there are additional benets to
the division of labor that have so far been neglected, which explain why divi-
sion of labor may occur where it is not expected (\over"-specialization). The
existence of these benets is relevant to the trade-o between a tayloristic
and holistic organization of production. Lindbeck and Snower (2000) argue
that new versatile technologies which make workplaces more exible, such as
computers, diminish the gains from specialization. Accordingly, production
under new technologies should be less divided. However, this paper shows
that if the versatility of the new technology renders it more dicult to deter-
mine how a production result has been achieved, then the diminishing gains
from specialization may be oset by the incentive gains from the division of
labor
The second main insight of this paper is that inducing a game between
agents helps implement activities, even when agents are not played o against
each other as in Dewatripont and Tirole's article on advocates (1999). The
paper also explains how it is possible to prevent collusion among agents to
undermine the implementation in this case. This requires, however, that
agents' productivities dier in a specic way, and that the less productive
agent be assigned to the easy task. For this assignment, the principal has
to know the costs of the agents. If these costs are private information, the
principal should implement a mechanism to elicit them. Our conjecture is
that such a mechanism may be constructed by allowing agents to self-select
tasks, and giving the agent assigned to the easy task the right to denounce
an unproductive colleague assigned to the demanding task. Designing such
a mechanism, however, is beyond the scope of this paper, and it is left to
future research. Interestingly, the assignment of agents to tasks in a way
that prevents collusion does not necessarily coincide with the comparative
advantages of the respective agents. This may explain the apparent absurdity
of situations where agents are prevented from carrying out a simple task and
have to rely on a less able co-worker, although it would be cheaper if they
were in charge of the whole production.
Both features, \over"-specialization and inecient job assignment, are
often associated with bureaucracies. Prendergast (2003) points out that bu-
reaucracies may be regarded as an optimal solution to the problem of pro-
15viding incentives, when important quantities are not tangible and cannot be
contracted upon. This paper extends Prendergast's observation to hiring de-
cisions and work assignments in bureaucracies: seemingly inecient hirings
and assignments can ensure the optimal provision of incentives in a sparse
contractual environment.
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Appendix
Proposition 4 (Implementation with continuous transfers). There is a con-
tinuous transfer scheme  such that the desired production (eD
1 = eD;eE
2 =
eE) can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium.







r: Observe that the payo of agent
i is concave and has a unique maximizer for any e i. This best-reply is char-









i(ek(i)) = 0: For e i = ek( i), the maximizer is hence ek(i):
Proposition 5 (Unique implementation with continuous transfers). If
@@R(eD;eE)
@eD@eE  0 for all e
D and e
E;
there is a continuous transfer scheme  such that the desired production
(eD;eE) can be implemented as a (unique) Nash equilibrium.
Proof. For notational simplicity, let agent i work on the demanding task (the
denitions and analysis for the other agent are completely analogous). Dene
~ e i(r) implicitly via R(eD; ~ e i) = r: Consider the following transfers i such
that i(r) is constant for r  r and twice continuously dierentiable for









18where the equality also holds for the limes r ! r with r < r. The second
derivative of the transfer in the outcome is:

00















This second derivative is not positive because
@@R(eD;eE)
@eD@eE  0 and
@~ e i(r)
@r > 0.
Then, consider the payo to agent i given a pure strategy e i: i(R(ei;ej)) 
ci(ei). Since i is a concave function in R and R itself is concave in eort
ei, the rst term is concave. Together with the observation that ci is strictly
convex, we obtain that the payo given a pure strategy is strictly concave. In-
tegrating this strictly concave function over the possible values for e i yields
also a concave function and thus there is a unique best-reply. Using con-
tinuous dierentiability of the integrand and the intermediate value theorem
for integrals, the payo given any mixed strategy of the other agent is equal
to some pure strategy e i. Without loss of generality, focus is restricted to
these strategies. First, consider the best-reply to e i  eE. By construction,
the derivative of the agent i's payo is zero at eD. Concavity implies that
the rst-order condition describes a maximum. The best-reply is hence eD:
Second, consider the best-reply to e i > eE. Then, the maximal transfer,
which occurs at r, can be achieved with an eort ei < eD. So, the best
reply is below eD.
If k(i) denotes the task carried out by agent i, the best reply is ek(i) for
e i  ek( i) and below ek(i) for e i > ek( i): So, the only xed point is
at (eD;eE): Since the best-reply to any strategy is a unique pure strategy,
there are no mixed-strategy equilibria either.
The condition,
@@R(eD;eE)
@eD@eE  0, establishes that the transfers suggested
in the proof are concave in the production result. As a result, the agent's
payo is concave and the agent has a unique and pure best-reply. However,
transfers do not have to be concave for the agent's payo to be concave.
Thus, violations of this condition are possible, and the desired eorts can
still be implemented using the same continuous scheme.
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